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A NEW DIRECTION FOR SHAREHOLDER
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM:
THE AFTERMATH OF CAREMARK
GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP*
Traditionally, shareholders seeking to encourage more envi-
ronmentally-friendly corporate governance have pursued one of two
strategies.' First, some shareholders have sought to nominate environ-
mentally-sensitive directors to corporate boards.2 Second, shareholders
have initiated shareholder resolutions regarding environmental practices.'
In some limited sense, these efforts have had positive results, raising
environmental awareness in the corporate governance community.4
However, from a purely tactical legal perspective, they have faced severe
impediments. Existing corporate law disfavors insurgent board can-
didates in director elections; and even where successfully elected, an
environmentally-friendly director may be unable to alter corporate policy
due to board structures preventing wholesale change in a single election
cycle (such as staggered boards) or fiduciary obligations which bar direc-
tors from serving special interests exclusively.5 Similarly, shareholder
resolutions concerning environmental protection are often excludable
from a corporation's definitive proxy solicitation as ordinary business or
*Assistant Professor, University of Toledo College of Law; A.B. (Economics), Harvard
College; J.D., Yale Law School.
1 There are, of course, other connections between environmental protection and the
corporate law. See, e.g., Robert H. Feller, Environmental Disclosure and the Securities
Laws, 22 B.C. ENvTLAFF. L. REV. 225 (1995) (discussing requirements to disclose envir-
onmental information under the securities laws); Richard M. Schwartz & Donna Mussio,
Environmental Disclosure Requirements Under the Federal Securities Laws, in
CONDUCrING DUE DILIGENCE 2003, at457 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. B-1368, 2003).
2 See infra Part I.A.
'See infra Part I.B.
Investor pressure may have helped spur or shame the corporate governance community
into pursuing increased self-regulation. See Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports:
"Cumulative Materiality" in Corporate Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley,
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483,492 (2005).
' See infra Part I.A; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 856-61 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power].
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beyond the power of the corporation to effectuate under applicable SEC
rules.' Even where a shareholder resolution is included in a corporation's
proxy solicitation, or where a resolution's proponents bear the cost of
financing a proxy campaign on their own, such resolutions are rarely
adopted and may have limited practical effect.'
This Essay attempts to flesh out an alternative strategy for en-
vironmental activists based on the Delaware Chancery Court's decision
in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation. Caremark
may have breathed new life into the fiduciary duty of care by declaring
persistent failures to establish compliance and oversight systems to
prevent illegal activities to be a breach of directors' business judgment
so as to give rise to liability to shareholders (and make available other
forms of relief, such as injunctions).9 While Caremark was a case dealing
with healthcare billing and accounting fraud,"° its application in the envi-
ronmental context seems clear. This Essay will detail the legal burdens,
benefits, and strategies available to environmental activists in a post-
Caremark setting.
Part I explores the tactical limitations facing traditional share-
holder environmental activism efforts. Part II discusses the Caremark
case. Part III sets forth the likely applications of Caremark in the
environmental arena.
I. TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF SHAREHOLDER ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTIVISM
This section discusses the limitations of the most common tools
for what this Essay will call "shareholder environmental activism." While
this Essay will treat such activism as a single phenomenon, there are of
course differences between various environmentally-conscious share-
holder campaigns. Some shareholder activists may target specific envi-
ronmental practices of their firms. Others may aim at achieving the more
amorphous concept of "green management."" Some activism may be
'See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
'In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
9Id.
10 Id.
11 "Green management" is a term that has been used both broadly and to denote more
specific business practices in literature on the environmental behavior of corporations. See
Joseph F. DiMento & Francesco Bertolini, Green Management and the Regulatory Process:
[Vol. 31:163
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globally directed, while other activism may be targeted towards specific
local environmental concerns.
A. Environmentally-Friendly Directors
One approach for environmentally-conscious shareholders is to
seek to nominate and elect to corporate boards directors who are likely
to favor sound environmental practices. Shareholders may nominate
directors in three ways: at an annual meeting; through recommendation
to the corporation's nominating committee; and through a proxy battle. 2
Such an effort faces the same uphill battle as does any insurgency cam-
paign aimed at replacing directors on a corporate board for the sake of
changing corporate business practices. Nomination of directors at share-
holder meetings is unlikely to succeed given that many shareholders vote
by proxy prior to an annual meeting, making it unlikely for a candidate
nominated at a meeting to obtain the necessary votes.'" Recommendation
to a corporation's nominating committee is also unlikely to be effective,
because corporations are under no obligation to consider shareholder
nominations or to give any explanation for their refusal to nominate a
recommended individual. 4
Nor is a direct proxy challenge likely to succeed. Insurgents are
at a huge disadvantage when compared to incumbent directors because
they will be unlikely to get their nominees on the company's definitive
proxy solicitation statement. 15 Absent that, insurgents will be forced to
finance the costs of a proxy campaign on their own (something that very
few shareholder groups will be able to, or are interested in doing).'6
While there has been recent action in this area, including high-level
ForMotherEarth, Market Share, and Modern Rule, 9 TRANSNAT'LLAW. 121(1996). It may
include: "(1) a commitment to research and development to create innovative technologies
and processes...; (2) innovations aimed at reducing environmental impacts in the firm's
relationships with its dependents and subsidiaries; and (3) development of products
which are environmentally friendly.. . ." Id. at 124.
2 See Lewis J. Sundquist III, Comment, Proposal to Allow Shareholder Nomination of
Corporate Directors: Overreaction in Times of Corporate Scandal, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1471, 1475 (2004).
13 Id. at 1476-77.
14 Id. at 1477.
5 Id. at 1471 & n.2.
'
6 Id. at 1479 ("The cost of undertaking such an endeavor can be quite high."). Such costs
can easily exceed $1 million for a large company. Id. at 1479 n.70.
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proposals to increase shareholder access to the corporation's definitive
proxy, the fate of such proposals remains in doubt.17
The harsh reality for the activist shareholder is that, absent re-
form, the corporate election process does not provide significant power to
shareholders. As Lucian Bebchuk writes:
[U]nder current arrangements, shareholders seeking to
exercise their theoretical power to replace directors face
substantial impediments. Challengers do not have the
access to the corporate ballot and to the corporation's proxy
machinery that incumbents enjoy. Unlike incumbents,
who have their campaign costs fully borne by the company,
challengers have to bear their campaign costs themselves-
even though they will share the benefits from improved
corporate governance with their fellow shareholders....
In a study of such challenges during the seven-year period
1996-2002, I found that, among thousands of public com-
panies, there were on average only eleven such challenges
a year, with less than two a year for firms with market
capitalization exceeding $200 million.'"
While institutional investors might be able to overcome some of
these impediments and encourage greater environmental consciousness
in the corporate community,19 it is not at all clear that institutional in-
vestors will generally have an incentive to do so. 20
v Id. at 1472. In 2003, the SEC listed various alternatives to "increase shareholder in-
volvement in the nomination and election of directors," including a proposal that would
allow shareholders access to the corporation's definitive proxy statement. Id. at 1480.
However, the SEC envisioned access only following certain triggering events, such as a
large number of abstentions in a previous director election or the failure of a corporation
to act on a shareholder proposal after it received a majority of shareholder votes. Id. at
1481. Other potential triggers might include criminal indictments of corporate officers
or a sanctioning of the company. Id. at 1482. However, the proposed rule was never
finalized, and appears to be dead. See Posting of Christine to The Conglomerate, http:/l
www.theconglomerate.org/2005/02/shareholder-acc-1.html (Feb. 8, 2005, 09:07 EST).
1 8Bebchuk, The Case forlncreasing ShareholderPower, supra note 5, at 856 (citation omitted).
See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 94-98 (2005) (noting that "institutional
investors, a critical class of shareholders, are increasingly requiring.., consideration"
of social and environmental concerns).
2 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental
Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 247, 291-93 (2002).
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B. Shareholder Resolutions
Environmentally-conscious shareholders may also attempt to
secure adoption of resolutions committing the firm to environmentally
sensitive practices. 21 During a single year, for example, environmental
issues were part of shareholder resolutions at fifty-six companies in
seventeen industries.22 Such proposals "range from general calls for com-
panies to adopt environmental values to specific demands for environ-
mental compliance."23 Such proposals have had mixed results,24 with
many being found to be excludable from a corporation's definitive proxy
statement under the federal securities laws.25 Typically, companies will
argue that such proposals are vague, have been substantially imple-
mented, are beyond the power of the company to effectuate, are insig-
nificantly related to the company's business, or are related to ordinary
business operations of the company.26 Even those proposals found not
excludable have rarely carried the necessary votes to secure adoption.27
One of the most well-known examples of environmentally-based
shareholder proposals is the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies ("CERES") Principles (formerly known as the Valdez prin-
ciples). 2' These principles "call on corporations to, inter alia, reduce
waste matter and provide for its safe treatment, market safe products
21 See Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism and the
Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465, 476 (1997) ("Increasingly, however, investors have
used shareholder resolutions and other internal procedures to bring pressure on corporate
management to consider investor favored policies when making business decisions.").22 Id. at 477.
23 Crusto, supra note 4, at 492.
24 Id. at 492.
25 Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 14a-8 promulgated
thereunder govern whether shareholder proposals must be included in a corporation's
definitive proxy statement. Geltman & Skroback, supra note 21, at 483. In specified
circumstances, a company may exclude a shareholder proposal and any statement sup-
porting the proposal from its proxy. Id. at 486.
26 For a discussion of the various grounds for exclusion under SEC Rule 14a-8, see id.
at 486-90.27Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43,
55 (2003)(stating that "resolutions that focus on social or special interest issues uniformly
fail"). However, there are signs that some companies may be altering their strategy
towards environmental resolutions. During the recent proxy season, two major companies
actually supported shareholder resolutions concerning the environment. See Williams &
Conley, supra note 19, at 97.28 See Schwartz & Mussio, supra note 1, at 501.
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and services, and provide redress for environmental damage."29 The main
focus of the CERES principles is disclosure.3" The Valdez or CERES
principles "were placed on the agenda by shareholders of many Fortune
500 companies," including American Express, Atlantic Richfields, Union
Pacific, and Exxon.3' As shareholder proposals, the principles have
generally withstood corporate efforts to exclude them from the definitive
corporate proxy statements.32 Some sixty companies had signed on to the
CERES Principles by 2005.33
Other environmental shareholder proposals, however, have not
fared so well. The so-called "Pure Profit Reports" proposals-proposals
that were part of an organized shareholder campaign in connection with
the World Resources Institute's March 2000 report, Pure Profit: The
Financial Implications of Environmental Performance34-- were suc-
cessfully excluded by corporations from their proxy materials under:
(1) Rule 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-8(i)(6), for being vague, indefinite, and mis-
leading; (2) Rule 14a-8(i)(7), for dealing with a matter relating to the
company's ordinary business operations; and (3) Rule 14a-8(i)(10), for
having been substantially implemented.5
Even where they are not excluded, shareholder environmental pro-
posals rarely win full shareholder approval.36 In part, this happens because
"[elven if a shareholder proposal is included, a registrant may include in its
proxy materials a statement explaining its opposition to the proposal."37
Although some have suggested liberalizing shareholder proposal
rules as a way of increasing corporate environmental protection,38 that
might be an effective but inefficient approach. Liberalizing shareholder
" United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1193 (2d Cir. 1993).
30 Geltman & Skroback, supra note 21, at 499.
3' Id. at 477.
32 See United Paperworkers, 985 F.2d 1190; Schwartz & Mussio, supra note 1, at 501;
Geltman & Skroback, supra note 21, at 491.
3 See Crusto, supra note 4, at 492.
3 ROBERT REPETTO & DUNcAN AUSTIN, WORLD RES. INST., PURE PROFIT: THE FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (2000), available at http://pdf.wri.org/
pureprofit.pdf.
31 See Schwartz & Mussio, supra note 1, at 501-02 (citing Mead Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act LEXIS 181 (Jan. 31, 2001); Potlatch Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act LEXIS 216 (Feb. 13, 2001); Willamette Indus., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act LEXIS 439 (Mar. 20, 2001)).
31 See Crusto, supra note 4, at 492.37 See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 21, at 491.
' See Richardson, supra note 20, at 319 ("[G]overnments could liberalize the formal
channels currently available for shareholders to intervene in corporate governance
processes, such as ... the shareholder proposal under securities regulations.").
168 [Vol. 31:163
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proposals could potentially expose corporations to greater "crank" pro-
posals and bog down boards with more shareholder-initiated resolutions.3"
II. THE CAREMARK DECISION
A. The Decision
Chancellor William T. Allen-now a professor of corporate law at
NYU-delivered his decision in In re Caremark International, Inc.
Derivative Litigation,4 ° in 1996. In many ways, Caremark is testimony
both to Chancellor Allen's individual reputation and confidence on the
bench and to the institutional power of the Delaware Chancery, insofar
as it was a decision in which a lower court judge effectively-in mere
dicta-overruled a twenty-year-old precedent from the state's highest
court.
4 1
The decision itself flowed from a fairness hearing on a settlement
of a derivative suit against Caremark International, Inc., a pharmaceu-
tical services company operating over 60,000 retail pharmacies in the
United States42 and providing "a variety of 'alternative' services, includ-
ing growth-hormone treatments and HIV/AIDs-related treatments, at
39 See Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 5, at 879.
It might.. . be argued... that granting shareholders the power to
intervene would result in the initiation of many proposals that would
have little chance of being adopted but that would impose costs on
companies and their shareholders. According to this view, many
shareholders might bring proposals that are unlikely to obtain majority
support because they are farfetched, ill-considered, or motivated by
considerations other than shareholder wealth. Although these
proposals would ultimately be defeated, dealing with them would be
costly: shareholders would be burdened by the need to vote against the
proposals, and management would have to devote time, attention and
company resources to campaign against them.
Id. at 879 (citation omitted). Professor Bebchuk, however, believes that a properly
designed shareholder proposal regime would help keep costs associated with "nuisance
proposals" to an "acceptable minimum." Id. at 879.
4 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959-72.
41 H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the
Post-Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 144 (2001) ("The chancellor's suggestion that
directors have an affirmative duty to see that the corporation has an effective compliance
program in place ... is a direct challenge to the very restrictive view of the director's
responsibility to oversee employee conduct expressed in the Graham case.").
2 Caremark Inc., Company Overview, httpJ/www.caremark.com (follow "About Caremark"
hyperlink; then follow "Company Overview" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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hospitals and managed care facilities."43 Caremark was charged with
various violations of the Medicare anti-kickback law and indicted in 1994
for multiple felonies." A plea agreement led to civil and criminal fines;
in total, the company paid some $250 million in fines and reimburse-
ment.45 A class-action derivative suit claiming that the board of directors
breached its fiduciary duties of care by failing to detect and deter illegal
kickbacks by company employees46 followed the plea agreement.47 Be-
cause Caremark was a Delaware corporation (even though it was head-
quartered in the Chicago suburbs), that suit was filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court.'
After some limited discovery, the derivative suit settled.49 The
terms of the settlement involved no payment to shareholders." Instead,
the company agreed to create a new "Compliance and Ethics
Committee,"5' to refrain from breaching the law in the future, and to
remove any employees from positions in which their primary task was to
pay kickbacks or bribes." Caremark and the plaintiffs petitioned for
approval of the class-action settlement pursuant to Delaware Chancery
Rule 23. 1. 3 Chancellor Allen's task was to determine the fairness of the
settlement to the corporation. 4 That required some analysis of the
merits of the class-action case.55 If the action was particularly strong,
then a settlement that involved no payment to shareholders, and no
payment by the allegedly negligent directors, would seem inadequate.
' David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1851 (2001).
Caremark was originally a division of Baxter International, but was spun off in 1992. Id.
at 1851 n.158. See also Brown, supra note 41, at 17.
4Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960.
45 Id. at 961.
"See id. at 962 (describing the kickbacks and other illegal acts occurring at Caremark).47 Id. at 964.
48 Id. at 959, 961.
49 Id. at 965. The initial version of the settlement involved directors giving up some of
their stock options; that aspect of the agreement was dropped. Id. at 965 n. 13.
o Id. at 965 n.13.51Id. at 966.
52 Id.
"DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1, available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules.chancery rules.pdf.
"Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
55Id.
170 [Vol. 31:163
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The complaint itself alleged a breach of the duty of care.5" Directors,
sitting on the board and statutorily authorized to manage a corporation's
day-to-day affairs, have a duty to perform their role with the care, skill and
diligence a reasonable person would employ under similar circumstances
in like position.57 Prior to the Caremark decision, however, the duty of care
was not viewed as having a whole lot of teeth." Delaware corporate law
authorizes the adoption by corporations of so-called "exculpatory clauses,"59
which, along with indemnification provisions' and Director and Officer
insurance policies6 ' make it unlikely that a director will be forced to pay for
fiduciary breaches. Moreover, directors are protected against duty of care
liability by the so-called "business judgment rule" an abstention principle
under which courts will refrain from second-guessing reasonably informed
decisions that are the product of a reasonable investigation and suitable
procedures and that have a rational basis.62
While the failure to monitor corporate agents might theoretically
lead to liability,63 the Delaware Supreme Court cast severe doubt on the
viability of such suits with its 1963 decision in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co.' The court found no breach of the duty of care on the part of a
board that had failed to act to put in place a monitoring system to detect
56 Id. at 960. Corporate scholars and judges generally divide duty-of-care cases into
"misfeasance" claims (challenging a board's decision or decision-making process), and
"non-feasance" claims (challenging a board's failure to take action). See, e.g., Evelyn
Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1445 (1998).
'
7 Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2003).
5 8See Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 88. Professors Williams and Conley note that:
[Some scholars] suggest that the duty of care generally has been elimi-
nated as an enforceable duty of corporate law as a result of the com-
bination of: the business judgment rule, which precludes personal
liability for officers and directors taking reasonable care in making
business decisions; indemnification, which authorizes or requires the
company to reimburse officers and directors for most forms of personal
liability; exculpation clauses, which companies adopt in their articles
of incorporation to eliminate a cause of action for breach of the duty of
care; and directors and officers (D&O) insurance, which effectively
shifts the financial risk of malfeasance to an insurance company.
Id. at 89.
59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).60 Id. § 145(f).
61 Id. § 145(g).
62 See generally Stephen A. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
63 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.
188 A.2d 125 (1963).
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price fixing violations by corporate agents: "[A]bsent cause for suspicion
there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate
system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason
to suspect exists."
65
Caremark effectively overruledAllis-Chalmers for the modem era,'
although it did so in dicta and recognized that a suit based on failure to
monitor was "possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win ajudgment."67 Chancellor Allen noted
three factors favoring his decision: (1) "the seriousness with which the
corporation law views the role of the corporate board;"68 (2) "the elemen-
tary fact that relevant and timely information is an essential predicate
for satisfaction of the board's supervisory and monitoring role under
Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law;"69 and (3) "the
potential impact of the federal organizational sentencing guidelines on
any business organization." ° Only the last explanation merited further
discussion: "Any rational person attempting in good faith to meet an
organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take into
account this development and the enhanced penalties and the opportu-
nities for reduced sanctions that it offers."7'
Therefore, a board has an obligation to assure itself that the cor-
poration has "information and reporting systems.., that are reasonably
designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each
within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the cor-
65 Id. at 130 (emphasis added). Ironically, even though the court's ruling in the case was
that no fiduciary breach had occurred, the Alliss-Chalmers scandals helped prompt
American corporations in particular to adopt the type of corporate monitoring systems
that the court held were not required by fiduciary law. See Lawrence A. Cunningham,
The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J.
CORP. L. 267, 278-80 (2004).
' Discussing Allis-Chalmers, Chancellor Allen asked, "How does one generalize this
holding today? Can it be said today that, absent some ground giving rise to suspicion...
that corporate directors have no duty to assure that . . .information gathering and
reporting systems exist... ?" Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969. Such a broad interpretation,
the Chancellor predicted, would not be accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996.
Id. at 969-70.67 Id. at 967.
68 Id. at 970.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 id.
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poration's compliance with law and its business performance. "72 While the
exact mechanics of such systems are left to the board's business judgment,
the board must use a "good faith judgment that the corporation's
information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention
in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that it may
satisfy its responsibility."73
Given this articulation of a board's oversight duties, Chancellor
Allen provided that a duty-of-care plaintiff:
[Would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or
(2) should have known that violations of law were occur-
ring and, in either event, (3) that the directors took no
steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situ-
ation, and (4) that such failure proximately resulted in the
losses complained of ....
The Chancellor added that "only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure
a reasonable information and reporting system exi[slts-will establish
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability."75
Turning to the facts of the case itself, Chancellor Allen concluded
that the settlement was fair and reasonable in light of the fact that there
was little evidence that the board knew of ongoing illegal kickbacks76 and
no evidence of a sustained and systematic failure to exercise oversight.7
Therefore, even though the Chancellor characterized the settlement as
providing "very modest benefits," he concluded that it was fair. 7' The
flaws in the plaintiffs' case meant that a better result was unlikely were
the case to proceed to trial.79
72 Id. Chancellor Allen did not explore some of the other reasons why failure to put in
place a monitoring system to detect and deter criminal acts would be unreasonable. For
instance, government contractors (including Caremark, which dealt extensively with
Medicaid and Medicare) who face criminal sanction may lose their eligibility for future
government work. See Brown, supra note 41, at 26.
" Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.74 Id. at 971.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 972.
71 See id.
20061 173
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The actual result of the case-that the settlement was upheld as
fair-is far less important than Chancellor Allen's articulation of the
standards of potential board liability for inattention or lack of oversight.
As one set of commentators noted: "While unconsidered inaction, in theory,
can render a director liable, no Caremark directors were found person-
ally liable. Caremark enhanced a director's risk of liability by opening the
door to increased scrutiny and reinforcement of the duty to monitor.""°
B. Aftermath
The Caremark decision has influenced other courts' understand-
ing of the duty of care under Delaware law, even though it is not a case
from the state's highest court.8 Subsequent Delaware Chancery decisions
(by other Chancellors) have described Caremark claims as difficult to
prove,82 but the decision has not been repudiated by another judge.83 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit read Caremark as
allowing for claims involving breach of the duty of care arguing "some-
thing less than intentional conduct. " '4
Initially, some observers have speculated that "a definitive state-
ment regarding a director's liability [in Caremark-type situations] must
" See Kimberly D. Baker & Arissa M. Peterson, Post-Caremark Implications for Health
Care Organization Boards of Directors, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 387, 392 (2004).
81 See, e.g., In re Abbott Lab. Derivative Sholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 805-06, 808 (7th
Cir. 2003). "Delaware law states that director liability may arise for the breach of the
duty to exercise appropriate attention to potentially illegal corporate activities from 'an
unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would,
arguably, have prevented the loss." Id. at 808 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967). See
also McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817 (6th Cir. 2001); Stanziale v. Nachtomi, 330 B.R.
56, 64-65 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Stanziale v.
Nachtomi (In re Tower Air, Inc.), 416 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2005).82 See, e.g., Saito v. McCall, NO. Civ. A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec.
20, 2004); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003). The Guttman decision,
interestingly, viewed Caremark as a duty of loyalty case:
Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod towards the
greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their corporations'
compliance with legal standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the
opinion articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight that
requires a showing that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by
failing to attend to their duties in good faith.
Id. at 506.
"a Id. at 508 n.39 ([Als I understand it, the well-thought out Caremark decision accu-
rately reflects our law, strikes a sensible policy balance in this difficult area, and I adhere
to it.").
84 McCall, 239 F.3d at 817.
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await a decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware,"85 although the
Delaware court gave no indication that it was inspired to reject Chancel-
lor Allen's Caremark intuition.8" In a case published while this Essay was
in the final stages of the editorial process, on November 6, 2006, the
Delaware Supreme Court expressly endorsed the Caremark position. In
Stone v. Ritter, the court "h [e]l d that Caremark articulates the necessary
conditions for assessing director oversight liability."87
C. Vitality
Central to Chancellor Allen's decision in Caremark overturning
Allis-Chalmers was the effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on
the "reasonableness" of corporate policy towards compliance and de-
tection of criminal activities.88 Since Caremark, of course, the Supreme
Court of the United States issued its opinion in United States v. Booker89
striking down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a mandatory system
of sentencing. ° It is certainly worth asking whether the Delaware
Supreme Court would adopt Caremark given the evisceration of one of
the legal foundations of that decision.
While the issue is certainly an open one, Booker probably does not
affect the soundness of Caremark. The leading appellate court decisions
post-Booker have indicated that while the sentencing guidelines are now
no longer mandatory, they are directive.9 For example, in 2006, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a sentence of life in prison that was within the
Guidelines in United States v. Denton,92 but remanded for further ex-
planation a decision to impose a below-Guideline ten year sentence in
United States v. Feemster.93 In the words of Ohio State University
Professor Douglas Berman, the Guidelines "remain the gold standard for
reasonableness review."s" Thus, even though it is possible that a judge
85 See Brown, supra note 41, at 6.
8 Id. at 16 ("Caremark ... represents a departure from precedent .... [Hiowever, [the
Chancellor's analysis] is in accordance with the main themes of corporate governance
over the past twenty years.").
87 Stone v. Ritter, 2006 WL 3169168 at *1 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
" Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
89 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
90/d.
9' See United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 2006).92 Id. at 1113.
93 435 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2006).
94Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, httpJ/sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing
_lawand-policy/2006/01/eighth circuit_ 1.html (Jan. 24, 2006, 12:03 EST).
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would not impose enhancement or reject mitigation based on a corpora-
tion's failure to implement the kind of monitoring called for in Caremark,
that judge would likely need to explain his departure in order to have his
sentence upheld on review. This means that generally, absent compelling
reasons which they feel comfortable putting on record, judges are likely
to avoid sentences which do not fall within the Guidelines. To the extent
that Caremark was good law in the first place, Booker changes little. It
would still be unreasonable to ignore the impact of the Sentencing Guide-
lines on the reasonableness of a corporation's decision whether or not to
have a compliance policy.
Moreover, there are other benefits associated with compliance
programs. Compliance programs, by avoiding or reducing the possibility
of illegal activity, can help preserve the valuable reputation of a firm.95
III. RAMIFICATIONS AND ROADMAP OF CAREMARK LITIGATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS
A fairly clear implication of Caremark is that the decision likely
requires firms to put in place a reasonable system for detecting environ-
mental non-compliance and lawbreaking. While other authors have
addressed the broader impact of Caremark on non-shareholder con-
cerns,9" this section focuses on the impact of Caremark on environmen-
tally conscious stakeholders.
In his Caremark opinion, Chancellor Allen explicitly suggested
that the ruling required the implementation of environmental compli-
ance systems: the ruling calls for an assurance of "corporate compliance
with external legal requirements, including environmental.., as well as
" See Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 93 ("The risks to business reputation from
credible allegations of human rights abuses create incentives for companies and directors
to consider these issues seriously, irrespective of whether an ultimate finding of liability
is likely.").
96 See, e.g., id. at 87-88.
As set out in... Caremark ... part of the directors' fiduciary duty of
care is a duty to provide oversight with respect to law compliance-a
duty to have systems in place to reduce liability risks from illegal
activities by employees.... [Human rights violations are part of the
liability risks that directors need to consider, at least to the extent of
ensuring that the company has established appropriate information
and reporting systems to assess risks of human rights violations, as
well as policies to address conditions that may give rise to such risks.
Id. (citation omitted).
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assorted other health and safety regulations."97 While Caremark is not
an "environmental factual case," its "basic principle... is instrumental"
in understanding corporate liability "in the environmental arena.""
Putting in place "information systems that assure that instances
of noncompliance are communicated to high level management"99 can
help reduce a corporation's exposure to criminal sanctions. Examples of
such programs have appeared in the case law.'00
Professor Lucia Ann Silecchia writes:
In the 1990s, with criminal enforcement of American envi-
ronmental statutes becoming more widespread, and the
consequences of violations potentially more severe, the
creation of effective environmental compliance programs
has rapidly become a priority for the regulated community.
In previous years, creation of such programs could have
been viewed merely as a responsible option to assist corpo-
rations in achieving or maintaining reputations as good
corporate citizens .... More recently, the possession of
a compliance plan became a desirable way of reducing
expensive civil and administrative penalties for the vio-
lation of environmental statutes. However, when the 1990's
ushered in increased criminal prosecution of environ-
mental violators, the stakes were raised significantly and
the motives for creating environmental compliance plans
changed.'
"The number of federal criminal environmental prosecutions substan-
tially increased in 1980s. "1°2 While teachers of white collar crime have
v Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969 (emphasis added).
9 8Mathias H. Heck, Jr. & Rhonda R. Mims, The Corporate Officer: To Pay or Not to Pay?,
THE PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 1998, at 24, 24.
' DiMento & Bertolini, supra note 11, at 146.
0 See, e.g., United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD, 11 F.Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla.
1998); United States v. Palm Beach Cruises, S.A., 206 B.R. 634 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Charles
A. De Monaco, Criminal Enforcement ofEnvironmental Laws: Changes to Environmental
Compliance Through the Security andAntiterrorism Prism, SH050 ALI-ABA 83 (ALI-ABA
Continuing Legal Education Course of Study, 2003) [hereinafter De Monaco, Changes to
Environmental Compliance] (citing United States ex rel. Pearl Shipping Corp. & Anax Intl
Agencies, Inc., No. CR-98-000384 MHP (N.D. Cal., Sept. 1999).
01 Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound Policies
for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 583, 583-87 (1996).
102 Id. at 587 (quoting Carol E. Dinkins, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental
Regulations: The Genesis of Environmental Enforcement Through Criminal Sanction, in
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been known to complain about the lack of published opinions in the area,10 3
published opinions are not in short supply because of an absence of
criminal actions,104 but rather because most accused corporations seek
plea agreements and implement extensive self-remediation. 105
The Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines themselves, of
course, provide for a reduction in fines for organizations that have im-
plemented compliance programs generally.° 6 A three point reduction will
flow from having in place an "effective compliance and ethics program" as
defined in the Guidelines. 107 The Guidelines provide an example of a
necessary environmental compliance system: "If an organization handles
toxic substances, it must have established standards and procedures de-
signed to ensure that those substances are properly handled at all
times."'0 ' Where there has been no compliance system in place, the
Guidelines mandate probation for organizations with more than fifty
employees. °9 Businesses may be forced to bear the costs of hiring a
specially appointed probation officer to monitor their behavior during the
probationary period."'
In addition to these formal benefits, the existence of compliance
plans may lead environmental enforcement authorities to pursue civil or
administrative actions rather than criminal prosecutions."' Significant
discretion exists in environmental cases-both at the Environmental Pro
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1, 5 (Donald A. Carr et al. eds. 1995)).
103 Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion,
and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115, 135-37 (1998).
104 Id.
105 See generally Silecchia, supra note 101.
106 U.S. SENTENCING COMM., GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f), at 496-97 (Nov. 1, 2006)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G. MANUAL].
"o7 Id. "Effective Compliance and Ethics Program" is defined in the Guidelines at section
8B2.1(a). Id. § 8B2.1(a), at 482.
108 De Monaco, Changes to Environmental Compliance, supra note 100, at *98 (quoting
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which are codified at 18 U.S.C.A. Appx.).
109 U.S.S.G. MANUAL, supra note 106, § 8D1.1(a), at 511-12.
o0 See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 8-12, United States v. Roger Williams Med. Ctr.,
No. 06-02, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/roger-williams_
deferredsentence-agreement.pdf. In this settlement, which likely mirrors the sentences
imposed by the courts, the defendant hospital was ordered to pay the costs of a monitor
for a two year tenure. Id.
" Silecchia, supra note 101, at 597.
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tection Agency ("EPA") referral stage 112 and at the Department of Justice
("DOJ") stage" 3-making it possible to influence regulators to stave off
criminal punishment."4 Some local prosecutors also explicitly consider
compliance programs in deciding whether or not to pursue criminal
charges against environmental offenders." 5
The sentencing benefits of an environmental compliance program
will become even more clear if the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations Convicted of Environmental Offenses" 6 are ever adopted.
The Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations Convicted of an
Environmental Offenses (authored by an Advisory Group in 1993 but
apparently never implemented) reward putting in place a compliance
program."' Under the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines, an organization
that fails to put in place a "program or other organized effort to achieve and
maintain compliance with environmental requirements, or... had such a
program in form only and had substantially failed to implement such a
program.... "would be subject to a four-level increase." 8 At the same time,
the existence of an appropriate environmental compliance program would
lead to a three- to eight-level reduction in sentencing score."'
The potential exposure to a Caremark-style claim creates a power-
ful incentive for corporations to develop and implement environmental
compliance programs. Injunctive relief may even be available to plaintiff-
112 Id. at 598-602; Charles A. De Monaco, Pollution and Corporate Compliance Programs:
Civil and Criminal Minefield or Corporate Savior, SG014-ALI-ABA 143, 158-160 (ALI-
ABA Continuing Legal Education Course of Study, 2001) [hereinafter De Monaco,
Pollution and Corporate Compliance Programs].
' Silecchia, supra note 101, at 604-06; De Monaco, Pollution and Corporate Compliance
Programs, supra note 112, at 158-160.
114 See Silecchia, supra note 101, at 598.
..
5 See, e.g., Heck & Mims, supra note 98, at 27-28 (noting that the Montgomery County,
Ohio, Prosecutor's Office considers the existence of a "meaningful and effective internal
compliance program" in deciding"whether to charge a person with an environmental crime").
116 U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT FROM ADVISORY GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL
SANCTIONS (1993), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/ENVIRON.PDF.
117 Silecchia, supra note 101, at 594. For a general overview of the Proposed Environ-
mental Guidelines, see Jeffrey M. Rosin, New Chapter 9: An Analysis of the Proposed
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Environmental Offenders and the Historic
Evolution of a Compliance Nightmare, 3 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 559 (1995).
11 See REPORT FROM ADVISORY GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL SANCTIONS, supra note 116,
at 16 (setting forth § 9.C1.1(f) of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines).119 Id. at 17 (setting forth § 9C1.2(a) of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines).
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shareholders, calling upon corporations to implement such proposals. 2 '
However, it is worth asking whether the implementation of a compliance
plan actually has any effect on harmful environmental practices."'2 Com-
pliance plans do not focus on positive environmental outcomes, but rather
on "means of managing compliance."'22 Even the most ingenious of moni-
toring systems might not overcome the practical limitations associated
with assessing a corporation's environmental compliance at a particular
moment. 23 Compliance methods may be "inherently limited in what they
can do, making the modest expectations associated with positive aspir-
ational controls sensible but increasing the likelihood of disappointed
expectations associated with the more ambitious efforts of negative pre-
ventive controls.""4 Moreover, the emphasis on compliance encourages
companies to achieve minimum legal requirements, rather than expand
environmentally conscious practices beyond what the law requires.'25 At
least some critics of Caremark have suggested that the decision requires
only minimal action on the part of board members seeking to satisfy
their duty of care.'26
How do you prove a sustained and systematic failure to exercise
oversight? An example of a successful Caremark claim can be found in
the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Abbott Labs., a case that arose
after the company engaged in a pattern of non-compliance with FDA
120 See Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the
Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PIT. L. REV. 389, 407 (2002)
("Caremark demonstrates the value of injunctive relief that may help to avoid shareholder
losses that derive from corporate liability for noncompliance with legal obligations.").
121 See Silecchia, supra note 101, at 594.
122 Id. at 615.
12 See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The
Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151,
151-52 (2004) ("Generally speaking, there is no single management or monitoring system
that comprehensively assures full compliance with all legal requirements on a continuous,
uninterrupted basis.").
"2 Cunningham, supra note 65, at 269.
12 5 Silecchia, supra note 101, at 624-28 ('[Tihe end to which all three of these plans strive
is full legal compliance, but little else.").
126 See Stephen F. Funk, Commentary, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation: Director Behavior, Shareholder Protection, and Corporate Legal Compliance,
22 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 311,321-22 (1997) ("The true import of the Caremark decision is that
directors need only take minimal steps to satisfy the demands of the duty to monitor and
are at a low risk of personal liability, because their business judgment' in implementing
a particular reporting system is given substantial protection.").
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regulation in connection with the manufacture of medical diagnostic
kits.'27 There, the court noted an
extensive paper trail . . . concerning the violations ...
[which] support[ed] a reasonable assumption that there
was a 'sustained and systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight,' in this case intentional in that the
directors knew of the violations of law, took no steps in an
effort to prevent or remedy the situation, and that failure
to take any action for such an inordinate amount of time
resulted in substantial corporate losses, establishing a lack
of good faith. 2 '
Other clues can be found in cases rejecting claims patterned after
Caremark. For instance, in a case involving financial irregularities, the
Delaware Chancery Court noted a plaintiffs failure to plead that the
company lacked an "audit committee," or "had an audit committee that
met only sporadically and devoted patently inadequate time to its work"
when it dismissed the plaintiff-shareholders' complaint.'29
Caremark-style environmental derivative suits are more relevant
in some contexts than others. Because they must target oversight and
compliance systems, such suits have relatively little to say about pollution
reduction or prevention. 3 While Caremark-style claims might help reduce
incidences of illicit dumping, they are unlikely to convince companies not
to engage in conduct that results in the destruction of natural environ-
ments through more gradual development and industrialization.
" In re Abbott Lab. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 809.
129 Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003).
130 See Silecchia, supra note 101, at 621 ("[C]ompliance policies do not focus at all on
pollution prevention or any other proof of environmental improvement.").
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